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MINDFULNESS, EMOTIONS, AND ETHICS:
THE RIGHT STUFF?
Ellen Waldman*
I. INTRODUCTION
What role do emotions play in ethical decision-making?  Philosophers
have long debated the question, disagreeing about both the nature of “the good”
and how best to achieve it.  Rationalists ground one’s capacity for virtue in
logic and deliberate cognition, while moral intuitionists look to one’s capacity
for feeling deeply.  Immanuel Kant, for example, maintained that right conduct
flowed from a sense of duty that functioned independently of emotion.1  Con-
versely, David Hume argued that all right action involved sentiment and that
reason, stripped of passion, could not impel ethical choice.2
Philosophers are not alone in their fascination with the question.  Psychol-
ogists also have delved into the relationship between emotion and moral devel-
opment, creating varying models of maturation that either embrace or reject
emotion as a critical component of moral discernment.  The competing visions
of theorists Leonard Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan illustrate the divide:
Kohlberg’s schema of moral development viewed linear, abstract thinking as
the apogee of moral sophistication, whereas Gilligan gave feelings of related-
ness, empathy, and affiliation pride of place.3
Today, debates in the “soft sciences” of the mind spill into the “hard sci-
ences” of the body.4  Interest in the biological bases of emotion invigorates
neuroscience, and developments in functional magnetic resonance imagery
(fMRI) promise methods for mapping the synaptic pathways that induce affec-
tive states.5  Although we can now detect activity in portions of the brain asso-
ciated with emotional experience, it remains unclear whether those electrical
surges push us in “right” or “wrong” directions. 
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1 IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 110 (H. W. Cassirer, G. Heath King &
Ronald Weitzman eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) (1788).
2 1 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 367-93 (David Fate Norton & Mary J.
Norton eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (1739).
3 See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); Lawrence Kohlberg, The Claim to
Moral Adequacy of a Highest Style of Moral Judgment, 70 J. PHIL. 630, 630-36 (1973).
4 See, e.g., Daniel Langleben et al., Telling Truth from Lie in Individual Subjects with Fast
Event-Related fMRI, 26 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 262 (2005) (examining correlations between
increased prefrontal and parietal brain activity and deception).
5 K. Luan Phan et al., Functional Neuroanatomy of Emotion:  A Meta-Analysis of Emotion
Activation Studies in PET and fMRI, 16 NEUROIMAGE 331, 331-48 (2002).
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In the mediation world, scholars and practitioners frequently treat emotion
as the unruly step-child of the problem-solving mind.6  They warn that untamed
emotion can provoke outbursts, distort interpretation, impair effective listening,
and scuttle Pareto-optimizing7 moves in countless other ways.8  For these rea-
sons, leading mediation theorists present emotion as a force to be blunted,9
manipulated,10 or leveraged11 in the service of “getting to yes.”12
In his most recent work, Professor Leonard Riskin similarly characterizes
emotion as a potential negotiation saboteur and offers “mindful practice” as a
useful corrective.13  Specifically, Professor Riskin argues that mindful media-
tion can help negotiators gain better control over their wandering minds and
negative emotions, and achieve more satisfying, interest-based solutions.14  In
an earlier work, Riskin touted mindful practice as a way to encourage emo-
tional awareness, discernment, and detachment, as well as a spirit of intercon-
6 See generally Don Ellinghausen Jr., Venting or Vipassana?  Mindfulness Mediation’s
Potential for Reducing Anger’s Role in Mediation, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 63, 64
(2006) (discussing contemporary views of anger as a destructive, unjustified element that
deprives negotiators of intelligent choice).
7 A Pareto optimal move or a Pareto improvement is a change “to a deal that make[s] at
least one person better off without making anyone worse off.” DEEPAK MALHOTRA & MAX
H. BAZERMAN, NEGOTIATION GENIUS:  HOW TO OVERCOME OBSTACLES AND ACHIEVE BRIL-
LIANT RESULTS AT THE BARGAINING TABLE AND BEYOND 65 (2007).
8 See Daniel L. Shapiro, Preempting Disaster:  Pre-Mediation Strategies to Deal with
Strong Emotions, in THE BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF MEDIATION:  BRIDGING THEORY,
RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 309, 310-25 (Margaret S. Herrman ed., 2006).
9 DOUGLAS STONE, BRUCE PATTON & SHEILA HEEN, DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS:  HOW TO
DISCUSS WHAT MATTERS MOST 89-91 (Penguin Books 2000) (1999).
10 See ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE:  THE SCIENCE OF PERSUASION (2001).  Many train-
ers and practitioners draw on Cialdini’s “principles” as part of their efforts to coax recalci-
trant disputants toward settlement.  For evidence of the impact of Cialdini’s work on the
mediation field, see James R. Coben, Gollum, Meet Sme´agol:  A Schizophrenic Rumination
on Mediator Values Beyond Self-Determination and Neutrality, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 65, 75-76 (2004).
11 ROGER FISHER & DANIEL SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASON:  USING EMOTIONS AS YOU NEGOTI-
ATE 99 (2005).
12 See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES:  NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITH-
OUT GIVING IN 11 (Bruce Patton, ed., 2d ed. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 1992) (1981)
(“[H]uman beings are not computers.  We are creatures of strong emotions who often have
radically different perceptions and have difficulty communicating clearly.  Emotions typi-
cally become entangled with the objective merits of the problem.  Taking positions just
makes this worse because people’s egos become identified with their positions.  Hence,
before working on the substantive problem, the ‘people problem’ should be disentangled
from it and dealt with separately.”).
13 See Leonard L. Riskin, Further Beyond Reason:  Emotions, the Core Concerns, and
Mindfulness in Negotiation, 10 NEV. L.J. 289 (2010).
14 Riskin defines mindful awareness as a “certain way of paying attention . . . with equanim-
ity and without attachment—to whatever passes through the conventional sense (touch, taste,
smell, vision, hearing) and the mind (thoughts).” Id. at 308.  He maintains that practicing
mindfulness induces a stance of “kindly curiosity,” which “allows the person to investigate
whatever appears without falling prey to automatic judgments or reactivity.” Id. at 321 n.59.
Maintaining this stance will, in Riskin’s view, help negotiators stick to Roger Fisher and
Daniel Shapiro’s Core Concerns System when self-centeredness, negative emotions, and dis-
tractedness threaten to intervene.
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nectedness and empathy.15  These traits, he argued, would help mediators
recognize temptation and avoid unethical boundary-crossings.16  The link in
both articles is the claim that mindful mediation helps individuals guard against
self-centeredness and self-destructive, emotionally-impelled aggression.  Addi-
tionally, each article urges mindful contemplation as a means of fostering the
equanimity and expansiveness central to effective negotiation and ethical
mediation.17
I do not take genuine issue with Riskin’s arguments.  Being able to experi-
ence provocation and the accompanying rise in blood pressure from a detached
attitude of “gentle loving-kindness” seems like a good thing from any number
of perspectives.  Instead, I examine in more detail the relationship Riskin posits
between mindful practice and ethical decision-making.  Does acquiring “pre-
sent-moment, non-judgmental awareness” in daily life lead to better ethical
deliberation?18  Can it help us pay better attention to the “cautionary thoughts”
that flash through our minds as we contemplate problematic behavior?19  Does
our moral sense evolve from careful thinking, or do the emotional intuitions
that mindfulness makes salient play a larger role?
This essay celebrates Riskin’s call to arms while suggesting some limits to
what mindfulness can achieve in the ethical realm.  I discuss recent develop-
ments in neuroethics that imply a prominent role for emotions in establishing
ethical restraint.20  I also survey a growing body of evidence that suggests the
directive power of our emotions remains largely hidden from and impervious to
the control of our “reasoning” selves.21  Lastly, I examine what Riskin has, in
an earlier work, described as the ethical hard case22 in light of recent explora-
tions into the emotional wellsprings of deontological versus consequentialist
thinking.23  Although the mediation community need not wade deeply into the
debates currently roiling social psychologists, it is useful to reflect on the gene-
sis of our ethical commitments and whether they continue to serve the field’s
long-term goals and interests.
II. EMOTIONS AND ETHICS:  THE DECLINE OF PHINEAS GAGE
What is it that separates good character from bad?  In Robert Louis Ste-
venson’s masterpiece, The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, a mysteri-
ous elixir transforms the beneficent Dr. Jekyll into the evil Mr. Hyde.24  But,
for Phineas Gage, a neuroscience enigma, the journey from civic virtue to
15 Leonard L. Riskin, Awareness and Ethics in Dispute Resolution and Law:  Why Mindful-
ness Tends to Foster Ethical Behavior, 50 S. TEXAS L. REV. 493, 494, 498 (2009).
16 See id. at 498-501.
17 See Riskin, supra note 13; Riskin, supra note 15, at 501-03.
18 See Riskin, supra note 15, at 495.
19 See id. at 499.
20 See infra Part II.
21 See infra Part III.
22 Riskin, supra note 15, at 501 (“The most challenging ethical choices arise when profes-
sionals face legitimate conflicting obligations. . . .”).
23 See infra Part IV.
24 ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON, THE STRANGE CASE OF DR. JEKYLL AND MR. HYDE (Kathe-
rine B. Linehan ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 2002) (1886).
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social ruin began, not with a vial, but with a blow to the head.25  While a
chemical brew unleashed Mr. Hyde’s amoral energy, the story of Phineas Gage
demonstrates that it is the chemicals in the brain, along with the feelings they
induce, that help people make socially responsible decisions.
Gage’s story, as retold by the neurologist Antonio Damasio, is a Kafka-
esque tale of injury, metamorphosis, and decline.26  In 1848, Phineas Gage, a
well-respected and successful railroad foreman, mishandled explosives with
terrible results.27  An iron rod three feet in length and a quarter inch in diameter
surged upward through his brain, resecting a crucial section of his frontal
lobe.28  Amazingly, Gage survived.29  In fact, he was conscious immediately
following the accident and calmly explained what had happened to the doctor
who attended him.30  In the doctor’s words, Mr. Gage “related to me some of
the circumstances, as he has since done; and I can safely say that neither at that
time nor on any subsequent occasion, save once, did I consider him to be other
than perfectly rational.”31
Stunningly, Gage’s mental faculties emerged intact.  His “attention, per-
ception, memory, language, [and] intelligence” all functioned normally.32  But,
his personality had radically changed for the worse.  He went from being a man
of “temperate habits” and “considerable energy of character”33 to being “fitful,
irreverent, indulging at times in the grossest profanity . . . manifesting but little
deference for his fellows, impatient of restraint or advice . . . .”34  Too impul-
sive and erratic to hold a job or sustain relationships, Gage drifted from one
position to the next, at one point earning money by displaying his wounds at
the circus freak-show.35  He was never able to stay in one place, save money,
or set down roots.36  Perennially on the outs, Gage limped along on society’s
fringes.37  He died, alone and unnoticed, at the age of thirty-eight.38
What happened to Gage?  According to Damasio, the unfortunate railway
man suffered damage to the ventromedial region of the brain’s frontal lobe
where emotion is produced and transmitted.39  After his injury, Gage could
think but no longer feel.  And, because he had lost emotion’s guidance func-
25 See generally JOHN FLEISHMAN, PHINEAS GAGE:  A GRUESOME BUT TRUE STORY ABOUT
BRAIN SCIENCE 1-10 (Houghton Mifflin 2002) (recounting the story of Phineas Gage, a rail-
way foreman who suffered a brain injury that left him physically intact but morally
challenged).
26 See ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR:  EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN
BRAIN (1994).
27 Id. at 3-4.
28 Id. at 4, 32.
29 Id. at 5.
30 Id. at 5-6.
31 Id. at 6.
32 Id. at 11.
33 Id. at 8.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 8-9.
36 Id. at 8-10.
37 Id. at 10.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 32.
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tion, he could no longer anticipate and plan for the future, empathize with
others, or harness his impulses to fit with existing social mores.40
Damasio studied twelve patients with similar damage to their frontal lobes
and each evinced the same set of deficits.41  These patients were cognitively
functional and scored well on standardized psychological and neuropsychologi-
cal tests.42  However, they could neither produce or access their emotions nor
imagine the emotions of others.43  Sadly, this defect in emotion production led
to an inability to make appropriate decisions in the personal and social
domains.44  Typically, these patients could not hold a job, maintain intimate
relationships, or manage the tasks essential for independent living.45
To be sure, not all of these difficulties map directly to the ethical domain.
Failure to perform at work, to select or emotionally satisfy a spouse, or to
maintain an income do not alone establish ethical dysfunction.  Nonetheless,
evidence exists that damage to those sections of the brain responsible for emo-
tion- production impairs decision-making in ways likely to lead to ethically
questionable behavior.46
Let us look at the gambling experiments conducted by Damasio and col-
leagues.47  In these studies, clinical subjects were presented with four decks of
cards.48  The subjects were given no information about these decks and only
instructed that their object was to make as much and lose as little money as
possible.  Unbeknownst to the subjects, each deck presented vastly different
opportunities for rewards and losses.  The cards in decks A and B paid $100.
The cards in decks C and D paid only half that amount.  However, wild cards
were interspersed throughout decks A and B that required the subject to pay a
hefty sum—up to $1250.  Decks C and D also contained cards that required a
pay-out, but those fines were minimal—capping out at $250.  Thus, decks A
and B offered larger incremental gains, but presented enhanced risks of signifi-
40 Id. at 10.
41 Id. at 53-54.
42 Id. at 54.
43 Id. at 207-212.
44 Id. at 54.
45 Id. at 55-58; Antonio R. Damasio, Daniel Tranel & Hanna C. Damasio, Somatic Markers
and the Guidance of Behavior:  Theory and Preliminary Testing, in FRONTAL LOBE FUNC-
TION AND DYSFUNCTION 217-18 (Harvey S. Levin et al. eds., 1991); Antonio R. Damasio,
The Somatic Marker Hypothesis and the Possible Functions of the Prefrontal Cortex, 351
PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 1413, 1413 (1996).
46 See generally DAMASIO, supra note 26, at 48-49; Steven W. Anderson, Antoine Bechara,
Hanna Damasio, Daniel Tranel & Antonio R. Damasio, Impairment of Social and Moral
Behavior Related to Early Damage in Human Prefrontal Cortex, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE
1032-33, 1035 (1999); Antoine Bechara, Hanna Damasio, Antonio R. Damasio & Gregory
P. Lee, Different Contributions of the Human Amygdala and Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex
to Decision-Making, 19 J. NEUROSCIENCE 5473, 5480-81 (1999).
47 See DAMASIO, supra note 26, at 212-19; see generally Antoine Bechara, Hanna Damasio,
Daniel Tranel & Antonio R. Damasio, Deciding Advantageously Before Knowing the Advan-
tageous Strategy, 275 SCIENCE 1293 (1997) [hereinafter Bechara et al., Deciding Advanta-
geously]; Antoine Bechara, Antonio R. Damasio, Hanna Damasio & Steven W. Anderson,
Insensitivity to Future Consequences Following Damage to Human Prefrontal Cortex, 50
COGNITION 7 (1994) [hereinafter Bechara et al., Insensitivity to Future Consequences].
48 Bechara et al., Insensitivity to Future Consequences, supra note 47, at 8-10.
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cant loss.  Decks C and D presented lower incremental gains, but exacted less
of a penalty when the pay-out cards were drawn.
Damasio’s lab ran the gambling test on individuals with normal brains, as
well as subjects with frontal-lobe damage.49  Responses among the non-dam-
aged control group diverged dramatically from those of the brain-damaged sub-
jects.  The control group began by taking cards from all four decks, but over
time (within the first thirty of a hundred moves) they gravitated to decks C and
D.  They developed a sense that decks A and B were “scarier” than decks C and
D, and this sense of risk informed their choices.  Although decks C and D
offered smaller rewards, the control group assumed that avoiding the “scary
decks” would yield a higher cumulative amount in the long run.
In contrast, the individuals with frontal-lobe damage, after initial explora-
tory moves, favored decks A and B over the safer C and D decks.50  Although
they initially gained more from the higher pay-outs ($100 as opposed to $50),
the higher penalties eventually led them into penury.  Interestingly, these self-
sabotaging choices were not ill-informed.  Patients with frontal-lobe damage
understood what was occurring; they understood that their choice of the cards
from decks A and B produced disastrous penalties that undermined the poten-
tial for gain.  Nonetheless, they continued to make the same self-defeating
choice.
Why?  According to Damasio, the group with frontal-lobe damage made
their card choices without the navigational assistance that emotions typically
provide.51  In his view, patients with normal brain function developed hunches
regarding the “goodness” or “badness” of each of the decks.52  These
“hunches” are comprised of unconscious, rough-grained assessments of the
reward/punishment ratio embodied in each deck, combined with bodily reac-
tions, or “somatic states,” that serve to mark the assessment and link it to the
appropriate stimulus.53  Thus, when a non-brain-damaged subject begins to
reach for the A or B decks, she feels a sense of threat (at a preconscious level),
which stays her hand.  However, individuals with frontal-lobe damage do not
have the neurological machinery required to generate somatic markers.54  As
they do not have a mechanism linking previous experiences with emotion, there
are no feelings to guide future choices.  Nothing signals to frontal-lobe dam-
aged individuals, “Don’t pick from deck A—you were hit with a painful pen-
49 Id. at 10-12.
50 Id. at 12-14.
51 Id. at 13.
52 DAMASIO, supra note 26, at 219.  For general discussion of the concept of “goodness”
and “badness,” see id. at 111, 186.
53 Id. at 221.  Damasio’s own explanation of the “somatosensory system” is especially use-
ful to understanding the concept of “somatic states,” as explored throughout DESCARTES’
ERROR and the remainder of this paper:  “from the Greek root soma, for body; the
somatosensory system is responsible for both the external senses of touch, temperature, pain,
and the internal senses of joint position, visceral state, and pain. . . .” Id. at 65.  “Note that
whenever I use the term somatic or somatosensory I have in mind the soma, or body, in the
general sense, and I refer to all types of body sensation including visceral sensations.” Id.
54 See generally Daniel Tranel & Hanna Damasio, Neuroanatomical Correlates of Elec-
trodermal Skin Conductance Responses, 31 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 427, 435 (1994) (noting
that evidence suggests the ventromedial frontal region may play a significant role in the
modulation of electrodermal responses to psychologically-derived stimuli).
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alty the last time you did that!”  Accordingly, these individuals pick from the
risk-laden decks again and again and again.
An inability to produce and experience emotional states leads to what
Damasio terms “myopia for the future.”55  That is, individuals set adrift from
their emotions are more likely to pursue outcomes that offer immediate high
rewards and bypass avenues for longer-term gain.56  Of course, this is exactly
the sort of mind-set that leads to ethical (and criminal) missteps.57  A mediator
who overcharges a client or breaches confidentiality to close a deal essentially
sacrifices her long-term reputation for immediate gain.  It is thus unsurprising
that individuals perennially unable to conform to social norms often suffer from
a deficit in emotional processing.58
Psychopaths, a population subset characterized by nihilistic disregard for
rules and boundaries, behave much like the frontal-lobe damaged patients when
exposed to the gambling protocol.  They continue to pick from the alluring but
ruinous A and B decks.59  Moreover, their self-destructive behavior stems not
from a defect in rationality or intelligence but from a deficit in emotional
processing.  When exposed to noxious stimuli (loud noises or visually dis-
turbing pictures), individuals diagnosed with psychopathology demonstrate
muted emotional response when compared to normal subjects.60  Clinicians
believe this problem is directly related to their inability to conform their behav-
ior to society’s dictates.61
Guilt, shame, empathy, and compassion have all been termed “moral emo-
tions.”62  Guilt and shame remind us that the intoxication of misbehavior is the
prologue to a hangover of remorse.  Similarly, empathy and compassion con-
strain self-interest, helping us see the world through other’s eyes.  Without
these moral emotions, we would cooperate less and defect more.  Thus, as
55 DAMASIO, supra note 26, at 217-18.
56 Id. at 217.
57 See Stephen D. Hart & Rebecca J. Dempster, Impulsivity and Psychopathy, in IMPULSIV-
ITY:  THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND TREATMENT 212, 227 (Christopher D. Webster & Margaret
A. Jackson eds., 1997) (speculating that, because of some “neurophysiologically based defi-
cit in emotion or attention, psychopaths are more likely to consider the possibility of antiso-
cial behavior and to evaluate such behavior as potentially rewarding” and that “psychopaths
are less likely to inhibit antisocial cognitions”); see generally Sabine C. Herpertz et al.,
Emotion in Criminal Offenders with Psychopathy and Borderline Personality Disorder, 58
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 737-45 (2001) (noting that criminal offenders with psycho-
pathic features demonstrate emotional hyporesponsiveness to both appealing and aversive
stimuli).
58 Hart & Dempster, supra note 57, at 221-22 (reviewing etiological models of psychopathy
that posit a neurobiological deficit as the cause of psychopaths’ “‘impulsive’—that is dis-
inhibited, irresponsible, and antisocial—behavior”).
59 DAMASIO, supra note 26, at 214.
60 Jack van Honk et al., Defective Somatic Markers in Sub-Clinical Psychopathy, 13
NEUROREPORT 1025, 1026 (2002).
61 Id.
62 Jonathan Haidt, The Moral Emotions, in HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES 852, 852-53
(Richard J. Davidson et al. eds., 2003).
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rational self-maximizers, devoid of emotional commitments, we would create a
chilly, trustless world.63
But emotion’s role as ethical bullhorn is imperfect at best.  To say that
emotion is a necessary precondition for ethical decision-making is not to admit
its sufficiency.  While our emotions may be easily manipulated, it is not clear
that even consistent mindful practice can help us master the unconscious, emo-
tionally-driven assessments that mark our thought processes.
III. STRANGERS FROM OURSELVES:  EMOTIONS THAT ELUDE
MINDFUL CONTEMPLATION
Professor Riskin urges mindful practice because it can reduce “automatic,
habitual ways of thinking, feeling and behaving” that inhibit collaborative, pie-
expanding negotiation, as well as ethical decision-making.64  But what if many
of our reactions to the world consist of automatic thoughts that are inaccessible
to our conscious selves?
A. The Adaptive Unconscious and Confabulation
In his text, Strangers to Ourselves:  Discovering the Adaptive Uncon-
scious,65 psychologist Timothy Wilson presents persuasive data of a dual cog-
nitive and affective processing system.  He argues that our behaviors are
directed by two distinct selves–one conscious, the other unconscious.66  On one
hand, our conscious self acts deliberately and in a controlled fashion on explicit
motives, emotions, feelings, and desires that are known to us.67  Our adaptive
unconscious, on the other hand, acts in an automatic way on the implicit
motives and emotions that Wilson believes remain forever inaccessible to our
conscious selves.68  Were Wilson (and many other psychologists) to read Ris-
kin’s work, he would likely agree that mindfulness can make us more attentive
to our explicit emotions.  However, he would caution that mindfulness is pow-
erless to influence or even penetrate the inner workings of the adaptive uncon-
scious, a structure that powerfully molds our most basic responses.
If our adaptive unconscious played an inconsequential role in our overall
behavior, then Wilson’s theory would hardly undermine the reasoning behind
mindful practice.  However, current understandings of the division of labor
between our conscious and unconscious selves allocate considerable heft to the
unconscious nether-regions of our psyche.  Some researchers view the con-
scious self more as an “after-the-fact check and balancer” rather than a primary
author of action.69  Psychologists have alternately used the metaphors of presi-
63 See generally ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON:  THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF
THE EMOTIONS (1988) (explaining how emotions cause people to act contrary to their own
self-interest).
64 Riskin, supra note 13, at 325.
65 TIMOTHY D. WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES:  DISCOVERING THE ADAPTIVE UNCON-
SCIOUS (2002).
66 Id. at 22-23, 49-64.
67 Id. at 44-49.
68 Id. at 23-24.
69 Id. at 49-50.
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dent and press secretary or hard-working federal government staff and figure-
head executive to capture the extensive role the adaptive unconscious plays in
maintaining functionality and driving decision-making.70  Although our con-
scious self commands slow and effortful deliberations, our adaptive uncon-
scious enjoys complete reign over the automatic, instantaneous judgments that
shape our course.71  As Wilson suggests, the fact that many of our reactions to
the world occur out of our “mind’s eye” means we often fail to comprehend
what we are feeling or the reasons we feel what we do.
For example, take the divergence between self-report questionnaires that
measure explicit, self-attributed motives and the information derived from psy-
chological tests that measure unconscious needs and drives.  The Thematic
Appreciation Test (TAT) is designed to measure implicit drives for affiliation,
power, and achievement.72  Subjects are shown pictures and asked to construct
stories about the pictures, which are then coded based on the levels of need for
power, affiliation, or achievement they reveal.73  Consistently, in study after
study, TAT results differ significantly from self-reports and serve as a better
predictor of automatic behavior than the information subjects provide in ques-
tionnaires.74  For example, TAT results for affiliation correlated and predicted
whether the subject would be talking with another person when a researcher
paged him or her at random intervals over several days.75  Thus, even if an
individual self-reported low-level needs for affiliation, a high TAT score for
affiliation likely resulted in researchers finding the individual engaged with
others, rather than in a solitary state.76  According to researchers, both the TAT
and self-report measures are accurate in their own sphere; each measures needs
and motives, the first implicit, the second explicit.77  However, the drives mea-
sured by the TAT will not achieve expression in a questionnaire because they
reside outside the realm of conscious awareness.
Our lack of clarity regarding how and why we experience certain emotions
extends to our most basic forms of excitation.  In a series of experiments
designed to test individual arousal to the opposite sex under both calm and
anxious conditions, an attractive female aide approached young male subjects,
70 Id. at 46-47; see also Robert Kurzban & C. Athena Aktipis, Modularity and the Social
Mind:  Are Psychologists Too Self-ish?, 11 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 131, 135-
36 (2007) (referencing metaphors of a press secretary and president for the “self,” but also
describing specialized modular cognitive subsystems as functioning akin to a “Machiavellian
spin-doctor,” selectively packaging  information for social advantage).
71 See WILSON, supra note 65, at 73-89.
72 Id. at 82-83, 91, 173-74.
73 Id. at 82.
74 Id. at 82-83; see generally David C. McClelland, Richard Koestner & Joel Weinberger,
How Do Self-Attributed and Implicit Motives Differ?, in MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY:
HANDBOOK OF THEMATIC CONTENT ANALYSIS 49, 51-52 (Charles P. Smith ed., 1992).
75 See WILSON, supra note 65, at 83.
76 See McClelland et al., supra note 74, at 53-54.
77 See PHEBE CRAMER, STORYTELLING, NARRATIVE, AND THE THEMATIC APPERCEPTION
TEST 265 (paperback ed. 2004) (“Implicit motives are derived from more primitive, biologi-
cally based needs, are intrinsically associated with affect, and are most easily expressed in
free-response situations. . . . Self-attributed motives are rooted in self-conceptions, which are
largely based on learning, and are best assessed using self-report techniques.”).
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ostensibly to fill out a questionnaire about creativity.78  After the subject com-
pleted the questionnaire, the aide offered to discuss the questionnaire in greater
detail and gave the subject her phone number.79  As a sign of how attracted the
subjects were to the young woman, the researchers recorded how many of the
subjects called her and asked for a date.80  Although the same woman partici-
pated in each encounter, the encounters took place in very different contexts.
Half the men were approached while they were standing on a flimsy footbridge
as it swung precariously between two deep gorges.81  The other half were ques-
tioned at a bench after crossing the bridge.82
The aide changed nothing about her appearance or presentation when talk-
ing to the men on the footbridge as opposed to those at the bench.83  Yet only
thirty percent of the men on the bench called her for a date compared to sixty-
five percent of the men on the footbridge.84  Why were the “footbridge” men
attracted to the aide at such higher rates than the “bench” men?  Why did the
geography of the encounter play such a significant role?
The researchers surmise that the men on the footbridge were physically
aroused as a result of their peril.  Their precarious physical location generated
physical responses:  their hearts raced, their pulses pounded, and they
sweated.85  Although one would think that the men would understand why they
were feeling so excited, the men seemed confused on this point.  The foot-
bridge men knew they were in a heightened state, but they misattributed the
source.86
In many situations, we support our misattribution with carefully con-
structed reasons.  Not only do we misperceive the source of our feelings, but
we clothe our error in a neat web of confabulation.87  Researchers have illus-
trated this confabulation in the celebrated “pantyhose” experiment:  Study
authors set up a display booth with pairs of panty hose arrayed side by side and
asked subjects to examine the panty hose and then rank them according to
preference.88  Earlier experiments had demonstrated that positioning of con-
sumer goods had a noticeable effect on preference, with goods furthest to the
right garnering higher ratings.89  Indeed, pantyhose proved no exception:  only
78 See WILSON, supra note 65, at 100-02; see generally Donald G. Dutton & Arthur P.
Aron, Some Evidence for Heightened Sexual Attraction Under Conditions of High Anxiety,
30 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 510-17 (1974).
79 See WILSON, supra note 65, at 101.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 102.
85 Id. at 101.
86 Id. 101-02; see generally Dolf Zillmann, Attribution and Misattribution of Excitatory
Reactions, in 2 NEW DIRECTIONS IN ATTRIBUTION RESEARCH 335 (John H. Harvey et al.
eds., 1978) (examining the principal theories of emotion as they relate to self-perception of
excitatory reactions).
87 See WILSON, supra note 65, at 104; Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson,
Telling More Than We Can Know:  Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV.
231, 251-53 (1977).
88 WILSON, supra note 65, at 102-04.
89 Id. at 102.
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twelve-percent of participants preferred Brand A, the pantyhose laid out fur-
thest to the left; seventeen-percent preferred Brand B, the next pair over; Brand
C attracted thirty-one-percent; and, the winner, Brand D, stationed on the far
right of the display, was preferred by forty-percent of research subjects.90
When questioned, the subjects offered various reasons for their prefer-
ences.  Some pointed to texture, others to the elasticity or durability of their
preferred brand.91  When asked if positioning had anything to do with their
choice, the vast majority said no.92 Instead, they maintained that their prefer-
ences were based entirely on the garments’ look, feel, and anticipated function-
ality.93  Yet they could not have made decisions based on those attributes
because the panty hose were all the same.94  Although the research subjects
formed preferences, they were oblivious to the reasons for those preferences.
Accordingly, they made up reasons after the fact.
While most people assume they do not confabulate, research indicates that
the practice is common.95  Responses that arise in the adaptive unconscious are
not subject to interrogation by our conscious selves.96  Therefore, when put on
the spot to explain these responses, we fabricate and are unaware that we are
doing so.97
These studies indicate that there are limits to our ability to understand and
control some of our most ingrained responses.  Professor Riskin urges mindful
practice as a way to mitigate   “automatic, habitual ways of thinking, feeling,
and behavior,”98 but ample evidence suggests that much of that automatic
behavior is evolutionarily hard-wired and not susceptible to conscious con-
trol.99  With practice, mindfulness may help us avoid becoming unduly angry
or upset when our negotiating partners do not accord us sufficient respect or
attention.  Nonetheless, mindfulness likely cannot give us insight into the
prejudices and stereotypical judgments that we make at an implicit, uncon-
scious level.  This fact affects the degree to which mindfulness can help us hew
to a higher ethical path.
B. Prejudice at the Unconscious Level
Imagine, for a moment, that Mike Mediator is presiding over a dispute
between a homeowner and a condominium board.  Mike is ethically required to
90 Id. at 102-03.
91 Id. at 103.
92 Id.  One person, who had just learned about positional effects, said yes. Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 See WILLIAM HIRSTEIN, BRAIN FICTION:  SELF-DECEPTION AND THE RIDDLE OF CONFABU-
LATION 13-14 (2005).
96 Id. at 4.
97 Id.
98 Riskin, supra note 13, at 325.
99 See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text; Arne ¨Ohman & Stefan Wiens, On the
Automaticity of Autonomic Responses in Emotion:  An Evolutionary Perspective, in HAND-
BOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES, supra note 62, at 256, 256-57; see generally Sachiko
Kinoshita & Marie Peek-O’Leary, Two Bases of the Compatibility Effect in the Implicit
Association Test (IAT), 59 Q.J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 2102 (2006) (reporting on four
experiments that investigate the mechanisms underlying the Implicit Association Test).
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mediate fairly and impartially.  Virtually every mediation code enjoins Mike
from favoring either the homeowner or the board representatives.100  Now
imagine that our mediator and the condominium board representatives are
white, while the homeowner is black.  Studies examining individuals’ implicit
racial associations suggest that this racial configuration might strain Mike’s
ability to function impartially.
Research using a test called the IAT (implicit association test) demon-
strates that even the most self-professed egalitarian may trade in stereotypes
that subtly influence behavior.101  Although Mike may believe that he is acting
impartially, he may signal non-neutral support for the board with selective eye-
contact and body-language.  In fact, Mike may be committed to practicing
impartially and his deliberate behavior may demonstrate that commitment; he
may think very hard about his introduction, subsequent interventions, and pay
close attention to the evenhandedness of his comments.  Still, controlled studies
using the IAT reveal that professed attitudes do not always predict more subtle,
non-verbal behavior, particularly when it comes to race and ethnicity.102
Like the TAT, the IAT studies unconscious forms of thoughts and feel-
ings.  Specifically, it requires test subjects to sort concepts and attributes into
categories and then evaluates the underlying associations.103  The test assumes
that subjects will more quickly sort items or concepts from categories that the
research subject perceives “go together.”104  That is, research subjects will
more easily, and therefore more rapidly, associate positive words (such as
“happy”) with items they view positively (such as flowers) and associate nega-
tive words (such as “ugly”) with items they view negatively (such as poisonous
insects).105  Creating categories that link “happy” with “black widow spider”
will, for all but the most ardent arachnophiles, challenge entrenched conceptual
structures, require greater cognitive functioning, and generate a longer response
time.
IATs studying race showed that many subjects harbored negative uncon-
scious associations with blacks, despite conscious declarations of non-bias.  In
one study, researchers measured explicit prejudice among undergraduates by a
twenty-item set of questions.106  Next, they measured implicit prejudice by
100 See, e.g., MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard II (2005) (“A
mediator shall conduct a mediation in an impartial manner . . . .”), available at http://www.
abanet.org/dispute/news/modelstandardsofconductformediatorsfirolos.pdf (adopted by the
American Arbitration Association, American Bar Association, and Association for Conflict
Resolution).
101 See Kinoshita & Peek-O’Leary, supra note 99, at 2103.
102 See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association
Test:  III. Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 17, 18
(2009).
103 See UNDERSTANDING PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 22 (Scott Plous ed., 2002);
Anthony G. Greenwald, Debbie E. McGhee & Jordan L. K. Schwartz, Measuring Individual
Differences in Implicit Cognition:  The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1464, 1464 (1998).
104 Greenwald et al., supra note 103, at 1464.
105 See Sally Lehrman, The Implicit Prejudice, SCI. AM., June 2006, at 32, 32.
106 See John F. Dovidio, Kerry Kawakami, Craig Johnson, Brenda Johnson & Adaiah How-
ard, On the Nature of Prejudice:  Automatic and Controlled Processes, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 510, 514 (1997).
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flashing black and white faces on a computer screen as a subliminal prime
before asking the students to make a decision about the word that followed.107
The primary measure of implicit prejudice was “the degree to which partici-
pants responded faster to negative words following the Black prime than fol-
lowing the White prime, combined with the degree to which participants
responded faster to positive words following the White prime than following
the Black prime.”108
In a subsequent study done by Dovidio, Kawakami, and Gaertner, Cauca-
sian research subjects were evaluated on how their implicit racial associations
and explicit racial attitudes relate to behaviors and impressions in interracial
interactions.  Following a self-report questionnaire and the race-oriented IAT, a
researcher told the subjects that they were going to engage in an “acquaintance”
study in which they would make the acquaintance of two “confederates” and
spend three minutes with each confederate discussing a topic prescreened for
race and gender neutrality.109  The confederates were drawn from the same
pool of undergraduates.110  In one discussion, the confederate was white, in the
other, black.111  The conversations and non-verbal interactions were recorded
on camera and tape.112  After each session, the research subject and the confed-
erate were both asked to fill out questionnaires describing, on a seven-point
scale, their impressions of how they and the confederate behaved in terms of
friendliness.113  Additionally, judges viewed audio and videotaped recordings
of the sessions and rated participants’ verbal and non-verbal behaviors based on
the same criteria of friendliness and warmth.114  Judges used the level of verbal
and non-verbal friendliness toward the white confederate as the baseline; they
assessed racial bias based on differences in the ratings participants received
regarding friendliness (verbal and nonverbal) toward the black confederate as
compared with the white.115
The study yielded several conclusions.  First, analysis of response times
recorded by the IAT revealed implicit bias against blacks by whites.116  Sec-
ond, explicit prejudice, as measured by the self-report questionnaire, related to
both observer ratings of verbal friendliness and participant self-perceptions, but
these measures did not correlate with the IAT results.117  Instead, the IAT cor-
related with observer ratings of non-verbal behavior and confederate percep-
tions of bias.118  Thus, a research subject who claimed to hold race-neutral
values and was friendly to her black confederate in conversation might none-
107 Id. at 513.
108 Id. at 517.
109 See John F. Dovidio, Kerry Kawakami & Samuel L. Gaertner, Implicit and Explicit
Prejudice and Interracial Interaction, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 62, 62-68
(2002).
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 65.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
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theless reveal significant levels of implicit bias and demonstrate nonverbal
behaviors that observers and confederates rated as unfriendly.  As the research-
ers expected, there was little correlation between participant’s self-perceptions
of bias and the perceptions of the confederates and observers.119  Rather, self-
knowledge was limited to conscious attitudes and deliberative action.120
Although the participants chose their words carefully, in-line with their ideas of
themselves as civil libertarians committed to equality, the conscious self could
not completely submerge the prejudices of its unconscious counterpart.121
Race-based aversion manifested itself in subtle, non-verbal gestures, which
were apparent to observers and discussion-partners alike.122
This and other IAT studies indicate that mindfulness–conscious attention
to what we say and how we say it–might not be enough.  Being ethical means
being impartial, but intense self-consciousness cannot guard against the subtle
workings of the unconscious.  Mike Mediator may strive to treat the home-
owner and the board representatives equally, but his nonverbal messaging
might undermine those efforts.  The way he uses his body, makes (or does not
make) eye contact, laughs, and clears his voice may communicate solidarity or
alienation in ways that elude his conscious awareness.
This is, of course, not an argument against mindfulness.  It is merely a
cautionary tale about what mindfulness can accomplish alone.  While mindful-
ness may influence our conscious feelings, we may need other techniques to
keep our subconscious biases in check.  For example, IAT scholars recommend
changes to individuals’ working environments, increasing exposure to images
and situations that contradict prevailing stereotypes.123  Thus, we can help
Mike to mediate impartially in an interracial environment by ensuring that his
working environment presents ample images of successful, high-functioning
black professionals.  If Mike works at a private, for-profit mediation firm or as
part of a court-connected program, it is important that he has black colleagues
with whom he interacts on a daily basis in collegial, mutually-respectful ways.
Unfortunately, the composition of the ADR field, to date, is notoriously, homo-
geneously white.124  Changing the composition of the ADR workplace will
likely promote impartial interracial mediation to a  greater degree than will
incorporating mindfulness practice into the routines of individual mediators.
Modifying the work place also holds greater promise than mindful emo-
tional awareness in curbing our selfish and self-aggrandizing impulses.  In his
text, Predictably Irrational,125 MIT economist Dan Ariely reveals our common
tendency to cheat in small ways and advocates environmental measures as the
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 67.
123 See Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, Categorization, Recategorization, and Inter-
group Bias, in ON THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE:  FIFTY YEARS AFTER ALLPORT 71, 77 (John
F. Doviodio et al. eds., 2005).
124 See F. Peter Phillips, Diversity in ADR:  More Difficult to Achieve than First Thought,
DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2004, at 14, 14.
125 DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL:  THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECI-
SIONS (1st ed. 2008).
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cure.126  Ariely hypothesizes two types of dishonesty.  The first is purposeful,
self-aware, and utilitarian.127  This type of dishonesty is exemplified by “a pair
of crooks circling a gas station,” evaluating the risks and likely rewards of
clearing out the gas station cash register and making a run for it based on a
calculated decision-tree analysis.128  The second type of dishonesty is stealthy
by virtue of its seeming innocuousness.  It is the kind
committed by people who generally consider themselves honest—the men and
women . . . who have “borrowed” a pen from a conference site[,] taken an extra
splash of soda from the soft drink dispenser, exaggerated the cost of their television
on their property loss report, or falsely reported a meal with Aunt Enid as a business
expense.129
This second type could also include padding a client’s invoice with extra billa-
ble hours or giving up early on cases pre-paid at a daily rate.
In a series of experiments conducted at Harvard Business School, MIT,
Princeton, UCLA, and Yale, Ariely discovered that students would cheat on
test answers if they were sure that they would not be caught.130  The good
news, however, was that they kept their cheating within bounds.  Students
would change their incorrectly marked answer sheets on approximately four out
of fifty questions, but they would not change all the answers to get a perfect
score.131  They were modest in their deceit.132  From these results, Ariely
surmised that most people value their integrity and honesty, but our honesty
monitor (Ariely analogizes this entity to Freud’s super-ego) only flips on when
we consider stepping seriously over the line.133  Until we reach that point, the
smaller stuff slips in under the radar.134
Ariely’s solution to this small-scale, but pervasive dishonesty has nothing
to do with the inward gaze.  Rather, like the IAT researchers, he suggests
changing our external environment.  Noting that cheating declined when stu-
dents were asked to recall the Ten Commandments, Ariely speculates that a
procedural mechanism to encourage “contemplation of a moral benchmark”
will facilitate greater probity.135  He suggests that professionals should sign an
oath pledging allegiance to the ethics code governing their field.136  Although,
theoretically, all professionals know their conduct should accord with prevail-
ing ethical standards, there is something significant about the reaffirmation of
allegiance immediately prior to the moment of temptation.  Based on extensive
field experimentation, Ariely concludes, “[I]f we are reminded of morality at
the moment we are tempted, then we are much more likely to be honest.”137
Although paying mindful attention to the twinges of guilt we may feel when we
126 Id. at 196-97.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 197.
130 Id. at 198-201.
131 Id. at 200.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 203.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 209.
136 See id. at 212-15.
137 Id. at 213.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\10-2\NVJ208.txt unknown Seq: 16  7-JUL-10 11:53
528 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:513
unethically exploit others could prevent large-scale fraud, we likely will feel
little guilt when contemplating smaller violations.  These ethical missteps that
elude conscious thought call for environmental changes, not internal
introspection.
IV. MINDFULNESS, EMOTION, AND HARD CASES
Unconscious responses influence our decision-making in the easy ethical
case, in which the ethical course is clear, but we are tempted to take shortcuts.
But what about the ethically hard case where compelling moral imperatives
push in opposite directions?138  Professor Riskin argues that navigating the
complex ethical case requires a calm and quiet mind and that mindful practices
can help cultivate that quality.139
Certainly, the ability to remain cool, calm, and collected when ethical
challenges arise is useful, yet mindful practice can only assist us in attending to
the thoughts and feelings that reach the level of consciousness.140  What about
the more subterranean workings of our mind?  How do emotion and cognition
work together to “solve” complex moral problems at a more unconscious level?
A. Utilitarian and Deontological Decision-Making in Hard Cases: The
Trolley Problem
Research psychologist Joshua Greene has been examining this question
through a series of experiments based on the “trolley problem” famously elabo-
rated by Judith Jarvis Thomson.141  The problem goes something like this:
A runaway trolley is hurtling down the tracks.  If it remains on course, it will kill five
people who are unavoidably lodged there.  You can divert the trolley with a switch so
that it will go down another track, on which one person rests.  That person will die,
but the other five will be saved.  Should you hit the switch?142
As it turns out, most people say yes; pulling the switch in this instance,
although agonizing, is morally justified.143  A second version of the trolley
problem, called the footbridge variation, tends to elicit a different response:
Imagine now that the trolley is heading down the track, ready to cut down the lives of
the same five doomed individuals.  This time, there is no switch, but a heavy weight
138 What constitutes an “ethically hard” case is open for debate.  In another text, I define
ethically challenging dilemmas as those where important ethical commitments come into
conflict. See ETHICS IN MEDIATION (Ellen Waldman ed.) (forthcoming 2010).  Professor
Riskin appears to adopt a similar definition when he writes, “The most challenging ethical
choices arise when professionals face legitimate conflicting obligations:  a lawyer whose
duty to foster the interests of his client seems to conflict with the obligation of truthfulness to
third parties; the mediator who experiences a conflict between the obligation of impartiality
and the obligation toward a quality process.”  Riskin, supra note 15, at 501.
139 Riskin, supra note 13, at 334.
140 See supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
141 Judith Jarvis Thomson, Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem, 59 MONIST 204,
206-08 (1976); see also PHILIPPA FOOT, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of
Double Effect, in VIRTUES AND VICES 19-23 (1978).
142 Joshua D. Greene, R. Brian Sommerville, Leigh E. Nystrom, John M. Darley &
Johnathan D. Cohen, An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment,
293 SCIENCE 2105, 2105 (2001).
143 Id.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\10-2\NVJ208.txt unknown Seq: 17  7-JUL-10 11:53
Spring 2010] MINDFULNESS, EMOTIONS, AND ETHICS 529
can stop the trolley.  You just happen to be positioned on a footbridge above the
trolley line, alongside a very, very fat man.  (You are, conversely, quite slender,
removing the possibility of productive self-sacrifice.)  You can save the five people
on the track if you fatally push the fat man off the bridge.  Should you?144
When faced with this dilemma, most people said no.145
Greene points out that, as a matter of theoretical consistency, this makes
no sense.146  A purely utilitarian approach would justify both throwing the
switch and pushing the fat man off the bridge.  Each disposes of one person
while saving five, a net gain of four, a conclusion of which utilitarians would
approve.147  On the other hand, a deontological perspective justifies neither the
push nor the throw.  Deontological ethics forbids treating people merely as
means to others’ ends; one cannot inflict harm on one individual, even if doing
so creates correspondingly greater goods for others.148  Thus, killing one to
save five fails from a deontological standpoint, regardless of whether we are
throwing switches or heaving people off bridges.  While some deontologists
have labored to justify the switch-throwing on the ground that the harm gener-
ated was foreseen, but unintended, those arguments are generally considered
unsatisfying.149
Greene brought a unique twist to trolleyology by subjecting individuals to
an fMRI brain scan while they pondered dilemmas similar to the trolley/foot-
bridge conundrums.  What he found was that when individuals contemplated
dilemmas that forced “up-close and personal” harms, similar to throwing the fat
man to his death, central portions of the brain associated with emotion were
active.150  In contrast, when individuals contemplated more impersonal, indi-
rect action, such as throwing a switch that would indirectly, but fatally, divert
machinery, portions of the brain associated with stored memory and reflective
cognition showed increased relative activation.151  Greene and others have read
the data to support a dual processing theory of moral reasoning that links deon-
144 This hypothetical rephrases Greene’s version in id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 2106.
147 See infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
148 See infra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
149 As Greene puts it, a Kantian might try to distinguish the two situations by noting that in
the foot-bridge example, one is using the fat man purely as a train-stopper—that is, as
merely a means as opposed to an end in himself.  In the trolley-switching situation, the man
being mowed down on the alternative track is not being used to stop the train.  His death is
an unfortunate by-product of a track switch that otherwise makes great sense.  This answer,
however, “runs into trouble with a variant of the trolley dilemma in which the track leading
to the one person loops around to connect with the track leading to the five people.”  In that
instance, most people still would throw the switch, even though the person on the looped
around track is being used to stop the train, just as the fat man would be. See Greene et al.,
supra note 142, at 2106 (“[T]here is no set of consistent, readily accessible moral principles
that captures people’s intuitions concerning what behavior is or is not appropriate in these
and similar cases.”); see also SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 100-105 (1998) (discuss-
ing the proposal that “instead of a constraint against doing harm, the deontologist should
accept a constraint against intending harm”).
150 Greene et al., supra note 142, at 2107.
151 See id. at 2106 fig.1.
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tological responses with emotional engagement and utilitarian reactions with
more purely cognitive circuitry.152
While this link has elicited criticism and inspired debate,153 it has ramifi-
cations for ethical deliberation in the mediation field.  If Greene is right, our
deontological instincts are driven by emotional intuitions that can be overridden
by “cooler” more deliberate cognition.  That raises questions regarding our
approach to the hard cases in mediation where our deontological commitments
conflict with more utilitarian calculi.  Therefore, let us first look at how deonto-
logical approaches, as opposed to utilitarian approaches, might manifest in the
mediation setting and how tensions involving these two approaches might arise.
B. Deontology and Utilitarianism in Mediation
Kant’s deontological theory is concerned primarily with rights and
duties.154  According to Kant, certain actions are morally compelled and others
morally forbidden, regardless of the consequences.155  Individuals have perfect
rights, such as the right to be treated as an autonomous being with inherent
rights of dignity and personhood.156  Additionally, individuals have perfect
duties, such as the duty to tell the truth.157  These rights and duties cannot be
transgressed, even if their violation would generate a better set of outcomes
than strict adherence.158  For instance, if a group of Nazi soldiers came to your
house and asked if you were shielding Jews from deportation and death, deon-
tological thinking would compel you to tell the truth and yield your human
contraband.  In short, the duty to speak truthfully remains absolute, regardless
of the tragic results.
Utilitarianism, on the other hand, is concerned primarily with conse-
quences.159  An action is morally compelled if it maximizes happiness, by cre-
ating the greatest good (happiness) for the greatest number.160  Whether an
action is morally right or wrong is not determined by a priori obligations but
rather by consideration of future consequences.161  When considering the Nazis
and the truth-telling dilemma, a utilitarian would consider whether disclosure
would maximize happiness for all affected individuals, and, based on the cer-
tain harm facing the Jews, would conclude that lying was the morally preferred
course of action.
152 See id. at 2107.
153 Greg Miller, Growing Pains for fMRI, 302 SCIENCE 1412, 1413 (2008).
154 See generally Onora O’Neill, The Moral Perplexities of Famine and World Hunger, in
MATTERS OF LIFE AND DEATH 294, 319-20 (Tom Regan ed., 2d ed. 1986) (providing a basic
explanation of Kantian ethics).
155 Id. at 319.
156 Id.
157 W. D. ROSS, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 18 (1930).
158 Id.
159 See generally Onora O’Neill, Kant and Utilitarianism Contrasted, in MORALITY AND
MORAL CONTROVERSIES:  READINGS IN MORAL, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (John
Arthur ed., 2005).
160 Id.
161 Id.
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Ethical dilemmas in mediation present classic deontological and utilitarian
tensions.  Consider how a deontological and a utilitarian thinker would broach
the following case:
Renee and Bill are divorcing after a twenty-year marriage.  Renee has raised the
couple’s three children, but has never worked out of the home.  Bill, a partner in a
brokerage firm, has managed the couple’s finances and investments.  Renee has
asked for a divorce, but feels guilty about breaking up the family.  Bill feels angry
and betrayed.  He believes Renee has “met someone else” and has taken the position
that Renee does not deserve half of the marital assets or child or spousal support.
Renee does not want to fight and simply wants the divorce proceedings over and
done with.  She is inclined to settle for much less than what is her due under state law
simply for the sake of obtaining closure.  She feels genuinely sorry for breaking up
the marriage and does not want to fight with Bill.
Regardless of ideological predilections, most mediators would likely engage in
a set of standard interventions.162  First, they would encourage Renee to consult
with an attorney regarding the concessions she is preparing to make.  In addi-
tion, they would pose a series of questions designed to inquire into the prag-
matic consequences of Renee’s situation:  What are Renee’s current and likely
future expenses?  What sort of earning potential does she have or envision hav-
ing in the future?  How will she live if she accepts the minimal package Bill is
offering?  What are the children’s needs?  How will those needs be met?  Why
is she willing to settle for less than the local child support and spousal support
norms would allow?
After recommending the retention of counsel and engaging in minimal
reality-testing, a mediator may then move in a variety of directions.  Existing
ethical guidance leaves ample room to maneuver.163
A mediator with a deontological bent would see his or her primary duty as
respecting Renee’s autonomy and promoting her ability to self-determine her
post-divorce life.  Kant emphasized every individual’s right to be treated with
dignity and respect.  Every individual, he postulated, has the right to be treated
as an end in herself, rather than as a vehicle for the satisfaction of others’
needs.  Thus, a mediator following Kantian thinking would, above all, try to
avoid persuading or coercing Renee to reach an agreement that diverges from
Renee’s own preferences, regardless of how idiosyncratic or irrational those
preferences might be.
By contrast, a mediator with a utilitarian bent would evaluate conse-
quences by determining what Renee’s waiver will mean for her and her chil-
dren five, ten, or fifteen years hence.  She or he would try to predict whether
162 See MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, supra note 100, at Standard VI.
163 Standard I, for example, commands mediators to ground their mediation practice in the
principle of self-determination by the parties, which requires voluntary, uncoerced, and
informed decision-making.  At the same time, Standard I explicitly relieves the mediator of
any obligation to ensure informed consent.  Thus, a mediator could emphasize the impor-
tance of obtaining sufficient information to make a knowledgeable settlement decision and
push Rachel to gather more information about the consequences of waiving her financial
entitlements.  At the same time, the mediator could assume a more passive stance on the
theory that Rachel is a fully autonomous adult who knows her own interests and likely has
very good reasons for choosing to settle for less rather than fight for more.  Both mediator
strategies could be viewed as consistent with the plain language of Standard I.
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allowing Renee to settle quickly now for a small amount will maximize happi-
ness in the long run, or if it will lead to longer term poverty and remorse.  This
mediator would prioritize Renee’s self-determination as secondary to facilitat-
ing an agreement that maximizes Bill’s, Renee’s, and the children’s long-term
best interests.
The deontological/utilitarian divide tracks the classic tension mediators
experience between conflicting duties to be fair and impartial.164  Do mediators
have any ethical prerogative other than facilitating party self-determination and
staying neutral?  Should fairness, as measured by legal or social norms, as
opposed to party preferences, play any role in the mediator’s thinking about his
or her ethical obligations?  If the parties are ready to go along, is there any
justification for intervening due to concerns about the settlement’s long-term
consequences?  If the parties are prepared to say the terms are fair, on what
authority may the mediator offer a different assessment?
Professor Greene concludes that our deontological impulses are evolution-
ary relics:  useful at one time, but increasingly wrong-headed.165  He holds that
our modern world requires a more rigorously utilitarian approach that focuses
on consequences.166  I do not go so far as Greene.  I would not jettison the
impulses that keep the fat man safe from a utility-maximizing death.  Still,
Greene’s suggestion that our deontological reflexes warrant examination may
apply in the mediation arena.  When we define our ethical responsibilities
solely in terms of promoting self-determination, we may be succumbing to
emotionally comfortable shibboleths without sufficient regard for the practical
consequences.  In particular, we should consider whether we are paying ade-
quate attention to the capacities required to act autonomously and the effects
such autonomous action will have on third parties.
I sometimes wonder whether the “autonomy reflex,” the reflex that limits
our ethical obligations to helping the parties before us meet their momentary
preferences, reflects a sort of moral laziness—an unwillingness to confront the
untoward possibilities that such a constrained understanding of mediation eth-
ics implies.  To be sure, unfettered consequentialism can lead to results as
absurd as those generated by a rigid Kantian stance.  It is for this reason that
some philosophers suggest a more flexible balancing approach, one which tem-
pers traditional Kantian concerns for autonomy with attention to conse-
quences.167  Our model standards provide a basis for this sort of balancing with
their emphasis on facilitating party self-determination while presiding over a
quality process.168
164 See generally Susan Nauss Exon, How Can a Mediator Be Both Impartial and Fair?:
Why Ethical Standards of Conduct Create Chaos for Mediators, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 387
(arguing that mediators cannot simultaneously satisfy their ethical duties of neutrality and
impartiality).
165 See Joshua Greene, The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul, in 3 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY:  THE
NEUROSCIENCE OF MORALITY:  EMOTION, DISEASE AND DEVELOPMENT (W. Sinnott-Arm-
strong eds., 2007).
166 Id. 
167 See generally ROSS, supra note 157.
168 See MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, supra note 100, at Standards I
and VI.
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Some have read the mandate to preside over a quality process as merely
reinforcing the primary mandate of self-determination.169  According to this
reading, the quality injunction is procedural only, oriented toward establishing
those conditions required for fully autonomous decision-making.170  It is also
possible, however, to read Standard VI’s quality requirement more substan-
tively.  One could read the Standard as requiring mediators to pay some atten-
tion to the fairness or equity of the outcome.171  In cases where power is
distributed asymmetrically, parties may drift toward disturbingly one-sided out-
comes.  Additionally, the proposed deal may threaten the well-being of parties
not at the table.  Arguably, a quality process would, at the very least, avoid
substantive outcomes that threaten long-term harm to both disputants and
absent third-parties.172  In this way, mediation ethics would incorporate the
duty of nonmaleficence,173 which is so often salient in other professional
codes.174
V. CONCLUSION
The question of what constitutes “right action” in the mediation setting
remains a subject of debate.  Some commentators advance an “autonomy uber
alles” philosophy,175 while others temper their responses with concerns for
169 Indeed, the language of the Standard itself and associated comments suggests that this
reading may best correspond with the intentions of the drafters.  Standard VI reads, “A medi-
ator shall conduct a mediation in accordance with these Standards and in a manner that
promotes diligence, timeliness, safety, presence of the appropriate participants, party partici-
pation, procedural fairness, party competency and mutual respect among all participants.”
Id. at Standard VI.  Notably, Standard VI’s definition of “quality” does not reference ques-
tions of substantive fairness at all.
170 Standard VI’s comments state that a quality process can only occur when:  the mediator
can commit sufficient time and attention to the mediation; the mediation takes place without
undue delay; the appropriate stakeholders are present; the mediator can remain impartial; the
parties have capacity to participate; mediator behavior is not influenced by the desire for a
high settlement rate. Id. at Standard VI, cmt. a.; see also Nancy Welsh, Making Deals in
Court-Connected Mediation:  What’s Justice Got to Do with It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 835
(describing quality requirement as relating to procedural, not substantive, fairness).
171 See generally Jonathan M. Hyman, Swimming in the Deep End:  Dealing with Justice in
Mediation, CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 19, 39 (2004) (suggesting that mediators may
profitably raise common-sense issues of fairness with parties).
172 Notably, the Ethics Standards for Family and Divorce Mediators do advise mediators to
suspend or terminate the mediation process if the disputants “are about to enter into an
agreement that the mediator reasonably believes to be unconscionable.” MODEL STANDARDS
OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION Standard XI (Symposium on Standards
of Practice 2000), available at http://www.afccnet.org/pdfs/modelstandards.pdf.
173 Nonmaleficence derives from the ancient dictum primum non nocere, which, translated
from Latin, means “Above all [or first] do no harm.” TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F.
CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 189 (4th ed. 1994).
174 See HIPPOCRATES, EPIDEMICS 165 (W. H. S. Jones, trans., Harvard Univ. Press 5th ed.
1962) (1923) (“Declare the past, diagnose the present, foretell the future; practise these acts.
As to diseases, make a habit of two things— to help, or at least to do no harm.”).
175 See Linda Stamato, Easier Said than Done:  Resolving Ethical Dilemmas in Policy and
Practice, 1994 J. DISP. RESOL. 81, 82-83 (suggesting that mediators face ethical challenges
when confronting power imbalances or inequitable outcomes, but arguing that mediators do
not “value” cases and that party self-determination must remain paramount).
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long-term consequences.176  Professor Riskin’s contribution urges mindful con-
templation to enhance ethics.177  Mindful contemplation, he suggests, will help
mediators avoid self-aggrandizing misconduct and handle with equanimity the
cognitive and emotional challenges posed by hard cases.178
This Article suggests we heed Riskin’s suggestions, albeit with modest
expectations regarding what mindful practice, alone, can accomplish.  It
reviews inquiries into the workings of the adaptive unconscious and surveys
efforts to uncover the neurological machinery that appears to power our diverse
ethical responses.  It discusses current theories regarding how our brain
responds to philosophical dilemmas that threaten deontological and utilitarian
commitments and speculates how mediation might incorporate those insights.
Finally, it suggests that the role mediation plays in facilitating dispute outcomes
imposes a duty on mediators to consider, not simply procedural, but substantive
justice concerns.  In this vein, adopting the principle of nonmaleficence would
be a useful add-on to existing codes of conduct.
To date, theoretical examination in mediation has been largely geared
toward exploring, critiquing, or defending the diverse models that populate the
landscape.  Scholars have parsed how these myriad approaches assume differ-
ent goals, endorse different methods, and deploy different techniques.  They
have assumed that different mediation models imply different ethical commit-
ments, but exactly how these commitments should be pursued or accommo-
dated in any particular case remains relatively unexamined.  We should be
grateful to Professor Riskin for initiating this conversation on mindfulness, eth-
ics, and their linkage in alternative dispute resolution.  We can only hope that
the conversation continues and deepens, as we bring our mindful attention to
bear on these complex questions.
176 See MEDIATING ETHICALLY (Ellen Waldman ed., forthcoming Dec. 2010) (manuscript
on file with author).
177 Riskin, supra note 13, at 334.
178 Id.
